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Some MIT researchers [1] have recently claimed that their implementation of the Slutsky-Brandt
attack [2, 3] to the BB84 quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocol puts the security of this protocol
“to the test” by simulating “the most powerful individual-photon attack” [4]. A related unfortunate
news feature by a scientific journal [5, 6] has spurred some concern in the QKD community and
among the general public by misinterpreting the implications of this work. The present article proves
the existence of a stronger individual attack on QKD protocols with encrypted error correction, for
which tight bounds are shown, and clarifies why the claims of the news feature incorrectly suggest
a contradiction with the established “old-style” theory of BB84 individual attacks.
The full implementation of a quantum cryptographic protocol includes a reconciliation and a
privacy-amplification stage, whose choice alters in general both the maximum extractable secret
and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The authors of [1] are concerned only with the error-free
part of the so-called sifted string, and do not consider faulty bits, which, in the version of their
protocol, are discarded. When using the provably superior reconciliation approach of encrypted
error correction (instead of error discard), the Slutsky-Brandt attack is no more optimal and does
not “threaten” the security bound derived by Lu¨tkenhaus [7].
It is shown that the method of Slutsky and collaborators [2] can be adapted to reconciliation
with error correction, and that the optimal entangling probe can be explicitly found. Moreover, this
attack fills Lu¨tkenhaus bound, proving that it is tight (a fact which was not previously known).
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, or, more properly, quantum
key distribution (QKD) is a discipline investigating tech-
niques to grow, out of a common secret key, a larger key
between two remote parties (Alice and Bob) linked by
a quantum and a classical communication channel. The
generated key can then be consumed to perform various
classical cryptographic tasks, such as encoding messages
with a one-time pad, but this is outside the scope of
QKD. In the last twenty years it has been shown that it is
in principle possible to grow the secret despite the chan-
nels being under the control of a non-disruptive attacker
(Eve) subject only to the laws of quantum mechanics, a
task deemed impossible in a completely classical setting;
this ability stems ultimately from the well-known trade-
off between acquired knowledge and state disturbance in
a quantum measurement. For an introduction to the sub-
ject, the interested reader is pointed to some recent [8, 9]
and forthcoming [10] reviews.
Broadly speaking, QKD protocols are based on Alice
transmitting quantum systems (usually photons) in ran-
domly selected states out of an alphabet of nonorthogonal
states. When Bob receives a system, he performs a mea-
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surement to infer Alice’s signal; at the end of the quan-
tum exchange, the measurement settings (but not the re-
sults) are publicly compared, and only results from com-
patible measurements are retained (key sifting). In the
sifted key, measurement results are ideally deterministi-
cally correlated, and any eavesdropping activity, which
fundamentally disturbs the exchanged systems, can be
monitored. The oldest and best studied QKD procedure,
described later on, is known under the name of Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [11]; other procedures,
very similar in spirit to BB84, are the entanglement-
based Ekert [12] and BBM92 [13] protocols.
QKD protocols so far devised consist of (a) a quantum
transmission followed by sifting over a public authenti-
cated classical channel, establishing a highly correlated
pair of keys at two remote sites; (b) a reconciliation pro-
cedure over the classical channel, allowing Alice and Bob
to agree on a shared identical random key; (c) a privacy-
amplification procedure over the classical channel which
ensures the security of a shortened key obtained from
the sifted key [14, 15]. An additional necessary task for
a complete secure protocol is authentication, but this is
of no major consequence in the present analysis. Since
the bits of the raw key are all statistically independent,
no information about the sifted key can be extracted
from the discarded bits of the raw key, and therefore
general security analyses are concerned only with sifted
keys. In both the reconciliation and the privacy ampli-
fication phases, however, information is exchanged over
2the classical authenticated channel, which can be per-
fectly spied, although not modified, by Eve. This is to
be taken into account, in order that, after a sequence
of appropriate procedures, both Alice and Bob possess a
copy of a key, about which Eve knows only a negligible
amount of information. The security of a QKD protocol,
therefore, relates directly to a quantitative estimation of
the amount of information potentially acquired by Eve
on the sifted and reconciled key.
The conditions for the security of full QKD protocols
have been extensively studied; in general, they depend
on the class of allowed attacks and on the degree of non-
ideality of the involved channels and cryptographic de-
vices. In this article only individual attacks, where Eve
is restricted to interact with and measure each transmit-
ted signal independently, are considered; moreover, the
channel is assumed to be noisy and potentially leaking,
but the other devices are ideal and the quantum exchange
is analysed only in the limit of very large keys. In this
scenario, security conditions are often expressed in the
form of a discarded fraction τ(e), that is the portion of
the sifted and reconciled key that is to be sacrificed in
order to obtain a final secret key. The discarded fraction
is a function of the probability that a bit at Alice’s site
and the corresponding bit at Bob’s site differ after sifting,
i.e., the quantum-bit error rate (QBER) e; in the usual
conservative approach, it must be assumed that errors in
the sifted key are entirely due to Eve.
Admittedly, this is not the state of the art in QKD
security proofs, since the most general class, where all
signals are made to interact coherently with a very large
probe which is then optimally measured by Eve (coherent
attacks), has already been tackled [16, 17]. Also, scenar-
ios where Alice and Bob’s devices are imperfect and po-
tentially manipulated by Eve have been considered and
partially analysed, as well as the case of finite lengths
for the exchanged keys. Finally, in recent years the def-
inition itself of what is a secure final key has changed,
due to the introduction of the notion of composability.
Literature on these subjects is too large to be even cited
here; the interested reader should refer to [10].
It must be remarked, however, that the case of ideal in-
dividual attacks still bears some importance because (a)
proofs for realistic devices and finite key lengths are ulti-
mately based on proofs for ideal ones; (b) security bounds
for individual attacks, although conceptually very differ-
ent, give results rather similar to the case of coherent
attacks, which is a convincing argument about the effec-
tiveness of eavesdropping strategies for those researchers
that see coherent attacks as technologically unfeasible;
and (c) individual attacks are a sufficiently simple class
to be readily understood by researchers working on prac-
tical implementations, and their complete understand-
ing helps dissipating that aura of phenomenologicality
which is sometimes associated to security bounds in ac-
tual QKD protocols (as if a security bound, which is a
purely mathematical statement and not an observable,
could be subject to experimental investigation).
Recently, Kim et al. [1] have claimed to physically
implement “the most powerful individual-photon attack”,
therefore putting the BB84 protocol’s security “to the
test” [4]. Following their suggestion that “the physical
simulation allows investigation of the fundamental secu-
rity limit of the BB84 protocol against eavesdropping in
the presence of realistic physical errors, and it affords the
opportunity to study the effectiveness of error correction
and privacy amplification when the BB84 protocol is at-
tacked”, in this article this particular attack [2, 3] (from
now on, the Slutsky-Brandt attack, (SB)[35]) is analysed
in the context of a complete and efficient QKD protocol.
For individual eavesdropping attacks, and using an ap-
propriate reconciliation protocol which does not correlate
signals, upper bounds on Eve’s information can be esti-
mated via the average collision probability of the sifted
key. A security bound as a function of the disturbance
has been derived by Lu¨tkenhaus [7] in both scenarios
when faulty bits are discarded or corrected, by modelling
Eve’s individual attacks by means of positive-operator-
valued measurements (POVM). In sections II and III
the SB attack is analysed, and it is highlighted that
this attack yields the upper value of τ(e), the discarded
fraction in the privacy amplification stage, obtained by
Lu¨tkenhaus when faulty bits are rejected, therefore con-
ferring Lu¨tkenhaus bound the property of being sharp,
as already pointed out by this author.
However, the BB84 dialect that is nowadays most
commonly adopted implements the reconciliation step
through error correction (instead of error discard), be-
cause this leads to a larger final secret key, as shown in
section IV. During this procedure, assumed perfect for
simplicity, an amount h(e) of information per sifted bit
(the Shannon limit [18]) is leaked to Eve and must be
discarded. In section V, it is shown that for such pro-
tocol the SB attack is not necessarily optimal, and in
no way threatens the upper bound on τ(e) as derived
by Lu¨tkenhaus for individual attacks on QKD protocols
with error correction [7].
Finally, in section VIA, it is proven that there exist
a stronger entangling-probe attack, and that this attack
leads to a discarded fraction that coincides exactly with
Lu¨tkenhaus upper bound, thus abrogating the regime of
hope for individual attacks against an ideal BB84 proto-
col with encrypted error correction subsisting thus far.
The mathematical techniques used in this article are
similar to those developed by [19, 20] and perfected in
[2], but an important extension is introduced in Sec.(II C)
which allows for a significant simplification of the prob-
lem. The final result suggests an intriguing relation
between the maximal collision probability achievable
through an optimal measurement and the fidelity of the
(mixed) states to be distinguished.
3II. MODELLING OF INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS
AND SECURITY BOUNDS
In general, a security proof for a given class of attacks
is made out of three main ingredients. First, one needs
a mathematical description (a parametrisation) of all el-
ements of the class. Then, one must estimate how dan-
gerous each element is with respect to the final goal of
establishing a secret key shared by Alice and Bob; this
very much relies on the definition of security, and usually
takes the form of non-tight bounds. Last, an optimisa-
tion is to be performed in the parametrised attack space
in order to bound the power of the most threatening el-
ement for each value of the disturbance parameter (e.g.,
the QBER). The first two steps in the case of ideal in-
dividual attacks, according to the approach of Slutsky,
Rao, Sun and Fainman [2], are reviewed in this section.
A. The entangling-probe model
In 1996 Fuchs and Peres [19, 20] introduced the fol-
lowing individual-attack model. Eve prepares a probe
and lets it interact with the signal system sent by Alice;
the joint unitary evolution leaves the two systems in an
entangled quantum state. The signal is then forwarded
to Bob, while the probe is stored by Eve and measured
after the reconciliation stage. Entanglement between the
system and the probe “induces” a correlation between
Eve’s and Bob’s measurements, allowing Eve to obtain
partial information on the key. This model is known as
Fuchs-Peres’ entangling-probe (FPEP) attack.
The definition of individual attack does not prevent
Eve from forwarding to Bob a system with a different
Hilbert space from the original one, a case not covered by
the FPEP model.[36] It has however been shown [7, 21,
22] that, if Bob’s apparatus can, to some extent, reveal
the presence of multiple systems in the signal, by adding a
sufficiently large penalty to the QBER in case of multiple
detections it is always possible to render these attacks
non-optimal for Eve.[37]
That the FPEP model indeed covers the full class of
individual attacks (at least among attacks where Eve
is forced to measure its system at some point) is a
consequence of Stinespring’s dilation theorem [23], that
guarantees that every completely positive and trace-
preserving map can be built by embedding the input
state space in the state space of a “larger” system, which
is then unitarily evolved and subsequently traced down
to a subsystem isomorphic to the output space. There-
fore, any quantum channel can be regarded as arising
from a unitary evolution on a larger (dilated) system.
Embedding in a larger space can be thought of as ten-
soring with an auxiliary system (the probe) in a fixed
initial state, because this provides an intuitive physical
model. The initial state can moreover be assumed to
be pure.[38] Stinespring’s theorem is a generalisation of
Neumark’s theorem [24], that shows that every gener-
alised measurement on a system can be implemented by
letting the system interact unitarily with an ancilla, and
then projectively measuring the latter.[39]
The explicit FPEP parametrisation for the BB84 pro-
tocol will now be introduced, following the notation of [2]
as closely as possible. In BB84, Alice randomly chooses
a basis from a pair {|u〉, |u¯〉} and {|v〉, |v¯〉} of mutually
unbiased orthogonal bases, and a signal bit, and sends
to Bob the first element of the basis if the chosen bit is
0, the second element otherwise. Bob, similarly, chooses,
randomly and independently from Alice, one of the two
bases, and performs a von Neumann measurement to de-
termine the bit. The sifted key is built from those ex-
changes where the measurements were compatible, i.e.,
when both Alice and Bob chose the same basis.
If U is the unitary joint evolution of the FPEP attack,
and |w〉 is the initial pure state of the probe, the overall
entangled state after interaction can be decomposed as
U |a〉|w〉 = |a〉|ψaa〉+ |a¯〉|ψaa¯〉, (1)
where a ∈ {u, u¯, v, v¯}, and |a¯〉 is the state corresponding
to the complementary bit (the states |ψab〉 are neither
orthogonal nor normalised). When the input state |a〉 is
sent by Alice, every outcome b of Bob is therefore asso-
ciated to an output state of the probe proportional to
|ψab〉. It is convenient [2, 19] to define an orthonormal
basis {|e0〉, |e1〉}, oriented symmetrically with respect to
the signal states, which can then be expressed as
|u〉 = + cosα |e0〉+ sinα |e1〉, (2a)
|u¯〉 = − sinα |e0〉+ cosα |e1〉, (2b)
|v〉 = + sinα |e0〉+ cosα |e1〉, (2c)
|v¯〉 = + cosα |e0〉 − sinα |e1〉, (2d)
where α = π/8, because the bases are unbiased. Since
|e0〉 and |e1〉 generate the signal space, the action of a
generic FPEP attack is then fully described by the action
of U on them; similarly to Eq.1, one defines
U |em〉|w〉 = |e0〉|Φm0〉+ |e1〉|Φm1〉. (3)
As for the |ψab〉’s, the four states |Φmn〉 are generally
neither normalised nor orthogonal; their number shows
that the probe space corresponding to a two-level signal
is effectively four-dimensional.
B. Attack-space refinement via symmetrisation
The aforementioned space of attacks is by far too com-
plicated to be completely explored. However, standard
techniques based on symmetrisation are available to re-
duce its size without loosing potential optimal elements.
The general idea is trivial: if a subset of the space is
known where all attacks are equivalent, it is sufficient
to retain only one representant of the subset during the
search. What is less trivial is how to characterise and
4find equivalent elements. In the picture of the entangling-
probe, all measurable quantities are determined by the
joint state χ of the signal and probe after interaction. If
ρa ∈ {ρu, ρu¯, ρv, ρv¯} is a signal state and ω = |w〉〈w| is
the initial probe state, then
χ(ρa, ω, U) = Uρa ⊗ ω U †, (4)
The effects of an attack (U, ω), both in terms of the
QBER and Eve’s maximum inference power, are sum-
marised by the statistical distribution of the χ’s, which
depends on the signal a-priori distribution pa, that is
(U, ω)←→ { pa; χ(ρa, ω, U) }a=u,u¯,v,v¯. (5)
Since, for BB84, the a-priori probabilities pa = 1/4 are
the same, attacks to the protocol have equivalent effects
if the rays of the states are permuted (without violating
the constraint that the two bases are unbiased). Readers
not interested in technicalities may now just retain that
the simplification of the search space implies that the
vectors |ψ〉 of Eq.(1) can be parametrised with only two
real parameters, and jump to Eqs.(22) in Sec.(II C).
All ray permutations can be generated with only two
involutions, for instance (1) the basis exchange and (2)
the bit exchange in the second basis; these two specific
symmetries are called in the following respectively R1
and R2. However, the approach is more general, and can
be extended to other cases, for example to the six-state
variant of BB84 [25].
Let Qi = Ri ⊗ I be a local operator on the joint space
of the signal and the probe[40]; if Alice changes her sig-
nal convention from ρa into RiρaR
†
i , and the final den-
sity matrix χ(RiρaR
†
i , ω, U) is transformed back in Bob’s
laboratory into Q†iχQi, both the QBER and Eve’s max-
imum inference power, which are average quantities, are
statistically unchanged. It follows, very much in analogy
to the passive-active picture of a reference-frame change,
that the attacks (U, ω) and (Q†iUQi, ω) are equivalent.
In mathematical terms
χ(ρ, ω, U) ≡ Q†iχ(RiρR†i , ω, U)Qi
= (Q†iUQi)ρ⊗ ω (Q†iUQi)† = χ(ρ, ω,Q†iUQi). (6)
Therefore, there is a direct link between a representa-
tion of the group G of symmetries of the protocol and
attack equivalence, and this remark can be exploited in
a useful way. Below we consider the case of finite G,
which is proper to the BB84 protocol. Since R1 and R2
generate the whole representation, by repeated applica-
tion of Eq.(6) it can be shown that, for all Rg, the attack
Ug = Q
†
gUQg is equivalent to U = U0 (ω is omitted here,
since it is always the same, and Qg∈G = Rg ⊗ I). For
BB84, the relevant group G is D4 [26, chap. XII, ta-
ble 7]; the action of the representation is illustrated in
Fig.(1). The order of the group is 8, so that the orbit of
U has at most 8 elements.
FIG. 1: A graphical representation of the orbit Ug∈[1...8] gen-
erated by applying the symmetry group of the BB84 proto-
col to a generic attack U . The whole orbit can be explored
using only the involutions R1 (basis-exchange) and R2 (bit-
exchange). The attack eU is the average of the elements on the
orbit, operates on an enlarged probe space and is symmetric
under the BB84 group. The search for optimal elements can
be restricted to these symmetric attacks.
Intuitively, a random application by Eve of attacks Ug
will give another equivalent attack. The idea can be for-
malised by extending the probe space with an auxiliary
space with |G| dimensions. Define
U˜ =
∑
g Ug ⊗ Pg and ω˜ = ω ⊗ Ω, (7)
where Pg = |g〉〈g| are orthogonal projectors in the aux-
iliary space, and Ω = |G|−1∑gg′ |g〉〈g′| is the density
matrix of a pure state with Tr(PgΩ) = 1/|G|. The con-
nection with the intuitive idea is that the projectors in
the auxiliary space randomly select the Ug’s; the con-
struction of (U˜ , ω˜) is represented in Fig.(1).
What is special about the “average” attack (U˜ , ω˜) built
in this way is that it is invariant under a group, which
can be built from the representation of G and some per-
mutation operators Xg on the auxiliary space. Let
R˜g
def
= Q†g ⊗Xg = R†g ⊗ I⊗Xg def= R†g ⊗ R̂g. (8)
Operators Xg are chosen such that if Q
†
gUℓQg = Uπg(ℓ)
then XgPℓX
†
g = Pπg(ℓ). This is always possible due to
the fundamental theorem [26, chap. XII] that any finite
group of order k is isomorphic to a subgroup of the gen-
eral symmetric group of all permutations of k elements,
S(k), which in turn can be naturally represented by the
set of all k×k permutation matrices. It is then sufficient
to fix one isomorphism and chose Xg as the isomorphic
image of Q†g; in this way Xg|ℓ〉 = |πg(ℓ)〉. It is now a
trivial matter to verify that
R˜gU˜ R˜
†
g =
∑
ℓQ
†
gUℓQg ⊗XgPℓX†g = U˜ (9)
and R̂gω˜R̂
†
g = ω ⊗XgΩX†g = ω˜. (10)
5One can therefore conclude that, given a group G of pro-
tocol symmetries, for each attack (U, ω) there exists an
equivalent attack (U˜ , ω˜) which is invariant under all R˜g’s
as defined in Eq.(8). It follows that the subset containing
all attacks invariant under such symmetries contains at
least one optimal element; the search for optimality can
thus be restricted to that subset. This finding is directly
relevant to the FPEP parametrisation, because it gen-
erates constraints for the |Φmn〉’s of Eq.(3). In fact, for
invariant attacks, replacing U with (R†g⊗R̂g)U(R†g⊗R̂g)†
and |ω〉 with R̂g|ω〉 shows that
URg|em〉|ω〉 =
∑
n
Rg|en〉R̂†g|Φmn〉, (11)
from which, for each symmetry Rg, the value of R̂
†
g|Φmn〉
can be calculated and used in constraints of the form
〈Φmn|Φpq〉 = 〈Φmn|R̂gR̂†g|Φpq〉. (12)
This formula is clearly valid for all g ∈ G, but in practice
it is sufficient to restrict its application to R̂1 and R̂2.
Also, it is more convenient to work with the symmetries
of the state vectors |a〉 instead of those of the correspond-
ing rays. This gives a representation of D8 instead of D4,
where redundant elements are included (like |a〉 → −|a〉,
which is physically indistinguishable from the identity);
the generated constraints are however the same.
C. The entangling-probe parametrisation
The authors of the FPEP model remarked that the
BB84 protocol, as described above, is endowed with
the basis-exchange symmetries R1 (an involution corre-
sponding to |e0〉 ↔ |e1〉). Then, using essentially the
same techniques described in Sec.(II B), namely Eq.(12),
they showed that an attack-dependent orthonormal basis
{|wi〉}i∈0...3 can be found[41] such that
|Φ00〉 = X0|w0〉+X1|w1〉+X2|w2〉+X3|w3〉, (13a)
|Φ01〉 = X5|w1〉+X6|w2〉, (13b)
|Φ10〉 = X6|w1〉+X5|w2〉, (13c)
|Φ11〉 = X3|w0〉+X2|w1〉+X1|w2〉+X0|w3〉. (13d)
With analogous considerations extended to anti-unitary
symmetries (complex conjugation in the probe space)
they also showed that all coefficients X are real numbers.
Note that this parametrisation satisfies 〈Φmn|Φpq〉 =
〈Φm¯n¯|Φp¯q¯〉 = 〈Φpq|Φmn〉, given by the constraints of R̂1
(as previously, the bar indicates the complementary bit).
The X ’s are correlated by the fact that U must be a
unitary operator, hence the additional constraints
1 =
∑
i=0,1,2,3,5,6X
2
i = ‖Φ00‖2 + ‖Φ01‖2, (14a)
0 = X1X6 +X2X5 = 〈Φ00|Φ10〉 = 〈Φ11|Φ01〉; (14b)
this shows that each FPEP attack, prior to Eve’s mea-
surement, can be described by only four real parameters.
However, as already said, there exists another symme-
try in the BB84 protocol which has not been exploited
by the authors of [2], namely R2, the bit-exchange sym-
metry in one basis only. This corresponds to swapping
the convention for 0 and 1 in one basis while leaving the
other convention unchanged. The bit-exchange symme-
try is generated by a Hadamard transformation:[ |e0〉
|e1〉
]
−→
(
1 1
1 −1
)[ |e0〉
|e1〉
]
. (15)
It is easy to check that |v〉 ↔ |v¯〉, while |u〉 and |u¯〉 are
invariant (actually, |u¯〉 has its sign flipped, but this does
not matter, since the physical state is the same). Using
R2|ej〉 = [|e0〉 + (−1)j |e1〉]/
√
2, after some elementary
algebraic passages, using Eq.(11), one obtains
R̂2|Φ00〉 = 12 (|Φ00〉+ |Φ01〉+ |Φ10〉+ |Φ11〉) , (16a)
R̂2|Φ01〉 = 12 (|Φ00〉 − |Φ01〉+ |Φ10〉 − |Φ11〉) , (16b)
R̂2|Φ10〉 = 12 (|Φ00〉+ |Φ01〉 − |Φ10〉 − |Φ11〉) , (16c)
R̂2|Φ11〉 = 12 (|Φ00〉 − |Φ01〉 − |Φ10〉+ |Φ11〉) . (16d)
Eq.(12) shows how to use these relations to calcu-
late additional constraints for 〈Φmn|Φpq〉 products. Of
course, not all combinations of indexes are interesting,
because quite a few are already fixed by other symme-
tries and the unitarity of U . As already seen, there are
at most four “independent” products, e.g., 〈Φ00|Φ01〉,
〈Φ01|Φ01〉, 〈Φ00|Φ11〉, and 〈Φ01|Φ10〉. The most impor-
tant constraint is obtained by calculating the first one,
〈Φ00|Φ01〉 = 〈Φ00|R̂2R̂†2|Φ01〉 = X1X5+X2X6 = 0. (17)
Together with Eq.(14b), this relation proves a funda-
mental property of the probe space for optimal attacks,
i.e., this space is the direct sum of two orthogonal sub-
spaces, one corresponding to bits received correctly by
Bob and the other to errors in the sifted key,
Span {|Φ00〉, |Φ11〉} ⊥ Span {|Φ01〉, |Φ10〉} . (18)
The symmetries analysed so far have also led to the con-
clusion that, within each subspace, basis vectors have the
same length, ‖Φ00‖=‖Φ11‖ and ‖Φ01‖=‖Φ10‖, and these
lengths are related by ‖Φ00‖2+‖Φ01‖ = 1. To determine
the full geometry of the probe one therefore only needs
to parametrise the intra-space products.
Applying Eqs.(16) to the other three products, namely
〈Φ01|Φ01〉, 〈Φ00|Φ11〉, and 〈Φ01|Φ10〉 (whose calculation
is greatly simplified by the previous orthogonality condi-
tions), one obtains the desired final constraint,
〈Φ01|Φ10〉+ 〈Φ00|Φ11〉 = 1− 2‖Φ01‖2. (19)
It follows the probe space can now be parametrised
with only two real parameters, the length ‖Φ01‖ and one
of the two inter-space products. In order to optimise
6Eve’s measurement, it is handier to translate these con-
straints in terms of the vectors |ψ〉. Using Defs.(1, 2, 3),
and solving for the |ψ〉’s, one finds
|ψuu〉 = cos
2
α|Φ00〉+ sin
2
α|Φ11〉+ sinα cosα(|Φ10〉+ |Φ01〉),
|ψuu¯〉 = cos
2
α|Φ01〉 − sin
2
α|Φ10〉+ sinα cosα(|Φ11〉 − |Φ00〉),
|ψu¯u〉 = cos
2
α|Φ10〉 − sin
2
α|Φ01〉+ sinα cosα(|Φ11〉 − |Φ00〉),
|ψu¯u¯〉 = cos
2
α|Φ11〉+ sin
2
α|Φ00〉 − sinα cosα(|Φ10〉+ |Φ01〉),
and similar relations for signals v and v¯, which, due
to the perfect symmetry of the bases, are not relevant
here. Trivial but lengthy calculations show that the cor-
respondence between the |ψ〉’s and the |Φ〉’s is unitary
(although not so easy to spot, since both vectors sets
are not orthogonal and not normalised), and therefore
all vector products are preserved.
Since attack optimisation is performed at constant
QBER, it is better to have e as a free variable; this is
easily achieved with the following reasoning. The value
of the QBER cannot be changed by a local measurement
by Eve after the signal-probe interaction is terminated,
and, by definition, does not depend on the reconciliation
procedure. From Eq.(1) it is immediate to understand
that, if signal |a〉 is sent by Alice, an error shows up at
Bob’s site with probability 〈ψaa¯|ψaa¯〉. Considering that
all signals have the same a-priori probability of 1/4, and
that the parametrisation, by construction, satisfies the
basis-exchange symmetry, one concludes that
e = 14
∑
a=u,u¯,v,v¯
〈ψaa¯|ψaa¯〉 = 12
∑
a=u,u¯
〈ψaa¯|ψaa¯〉 = ‖ψ01‖2. (21)
Therefore, the vectors of the “error set”, |ψ01〉 and
|ψ10〉 have length equal to
√
e, and the vectors of
the “good set”, |ψ00〉 and |ψ11〉, have length equal to√
1− e; moreover, the inter-space products, 〈ψ00|ψ11〉
and 〈ψ01|ψ10〉, sum up to 1 − 2e. By introducing the
inter-space imbalance δ, all these relations can be sum-
marised as in the following table:
Span {|ψuu〉, |ψu¯u¯〉} ⊥ Span {|ψuu¯〉, |ψu¯u〉} (22a)
‖ψuu‖2 = ‖ψu¯u¯‖2 = 1− e, (22b)
‖ψuu¯‖2 = ‖ψu¯u‖2 = e, (22c)
〈ψuu|ψu¯u¯〉 = 12 − e − δ, (22d)
〈ψuu¯|ψu¯u〉 = 12 − e + δ. (22e)
The imbalance is also limited by the geometrical con-
straint of scalar products, i.e., Schwartz inequality.
The allowed values for (e, δ),
− 12 ≤ δ ≤ + 12 − |1− 2e|, (23)
determined by
| 12 − e− δ| ≤ 1− e, (24a)
| 12 − e+ δ| ≤ e, (24b)
are represented on the left.
In the following of the article the set of equations (22) is
used, still under the name of FPEP parametrisation.
D. Estimation of Eve’s inference power and the
discarded fraction
As already explained in the introduction, after key
reconciliation a procedure called privacy amplification is
applied to reduce Eve’s knowledge to negligible amount
(assuming Eve is forced to measure at this point). Pri-
vacy amplification employs universal2 hashing functions
to compress the reconciled key, of length n¯, to a final key,
of length r. The discarded fraction τ is then defined as
τ =
n¯− r
n¯
. (25)
The theory of privacy amplification was developed in
a seminal article by Bennett, Brassard, Cre´peau and
Maurer [15], who found a condition for strong security.
Lu¨tkenhaus [27] used it to bound Eve’s average [42] Shan-
non information on the final key: for individual attacks,
the eavesdropper, on average, knows less than 1/ ln 2 bits
of the final key provided
τ(e) ≥ 1 + log2〈P 1c 〉, (26)
where 〈P 1c 〉 is the maximum average collision probability
of Eve’s knowledge of one bit of the reconciled key, for a
fixed value of the disturbance, the QBER e. Note that,
under conservative assumptions, all noise on the quan-
tum channel may be attributed to Eve, but it does not
have to; therefore, τ(e) must be a non decreasing func-
tion. If, for instance, τ(e′ > e) < τ(e), then Eve could
perform the attack causing error e, and then pass Bob’s
signal through a depolarising channel with error e′ − e.
Therefore, in the following, all τ ’s are to be considered as
monotonicised. If S is the random variable correspond-
ing to the bit sent by Alice, with values s = 0, 1, and M
is the random variable corresponding to all knowledge
acquired by Eve, with values m, the 〈P 1c 〉 is defined as
〈P 1c 〉 =
∑
m
P (M = m)
∑
s
P 2(S = s|M = m). (27)
However, when the approach of [2] is followed, it is
not necessary to calculate the conditional probabilities
P (S = s|M = m) nor the marginal probabilities P (M =
m), because the largest possible value of 〈P 1c 〉 can be
obtained by direct inspection of the state of Eve’s probe
after interaction, as shown in section III.
III. DISCARDED FRACTION FOR
INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS AGAINST A
PROTOCOL USING “FAULTY BITS DUMPING”
AS RECONCILIATION METHOD
In section II C it was shown that the QBER e is com-
pletely determined by the signal-probe interaction dur-
ing transmission. This is not the case for Eve’s inference
7power, which depends also on the reconciliation method.
Slutsky et al. [2], followed by [1, 3, 4], considered only
the case when all errors are discarded from the sifted key.
An evaluation of the cost of this procedure is postponed
to Sec.(IV); for the time being it will be assumed that it
can be performed without giving Eve any piece of infor-
mation other than the indexes of the retained bits.
Of course, it is very relevant to Eve that reconcilia-
tion is performed through error discard; in fact, her state
of knowledge on the signal-probe system conditioned on
Alice sending state |a〉 changes from that in Eq.(1) to a
pure state, just as if Bob measurement had collapsed the
signal state into |a〉,
U |a〉|w〉 = |a〉|ψaa〉+ |a¯〉|ψaa¯〉 “collapse”−−−−−−→ |a〉|ψaa〉. (28)
If, for instance, the encoding basis was {|u〉, |u¯〉}, Eve’s
probe, in Eve’s view, would be in an equiprobable mix-
ture of |ψuu〉 and |ψu¯u¯〉. In this case, intuitively, the
largest inference power is given by a measurement that
maximises the probability to tell the first case apart from
the second. It is known [28, 29] that optimal ambiguous
discrimination (corresponding to a minimum of the prob-
ability Perr of making a wrong guess) can be achieved by
means of projective measurements. For two pure and nor-
malised states, |φ0〉 and |φ1〉, assuming, without lack of
generality that 〈φ0|φ1〉 ∈ R, and defining the pure-state
fidelity as,
f = |〈φ0|φ1〉|2, (29)
the optimal von Neumann measurement is defined by the
directions |χ0/1〉 = θ0/1|φ0〉+ θ1/0|φ1〉, where
θ0/1 =
√
1−√f ±
√
1 +
√
f
2
√
1− f , (30)
and the minimum error probability turns out to be Perr =
1
2 [1 −
√
1− f ]. Building on a result of Levitin [30, 31],
the authors of [2] showed[43] that this measurement also
maximises the average collision probability and the drop
in Shannon and Re´nyi entropy, confirming the intuition.
The maximum collision probability turns out to be
〈P 1c 〉 = 1− 12f. (31)
Therefore, in the FPEP approach, the problem of opti-
mising Eve’s measurement is really trivial. The optimal
attack is that which minimises the value of f for a fixed
value of e. Due to the intrinsic basis symmetry of the
method, the value of the fidelity does not depend on the
basis.[44] Using Eqs.(22b) and (22d) one then easily finds
√
f =
|〈ψuu|ψu¯u¯〉|
‖ψuu‖ · ‖ψu¯u¯‖ =
| 12 − e − δ|
1− e . (32)
which is minimised at fixed e ≤ 1/3 by δ = 2e− 1/2 [see
the allowed range for δ in Eq.(23)], yielding:
min
z
|e
√
f =
1− 3e
1− e (e ≤ 1/3) (33)
(if e > 1/3, then, with δ = 1/2− e, the fidelity is exactly
zero, i.e., the two cases are perfectly distinguishable).
Substituting this result in Eq.(31), and then into Eq.(26)
finally gives the maximum value of the discarded fraction
(implicit in [2], and explicitly given in [4]),
τ(e) = 1 + log2〈P 1c 〉 = log2(2 − f) (34)
= log2
1 + 2e− 7e2
(1− e)2 = log2[1 + 4e− 4e
3 +O(e4)].
This formula is valid up to e = 1/3, where the function
reaches its maximum value, τ(1/3) = 1, after which Eve
enjoys complete knowledge of the key established by Alice
and Bob (see also the discussion of section IID).
A. The Slutsky-Brandt attack
Kim et al. [1], following a proposal by Brandt [3], ex-
perimentally simulate a particular eavesdropping attack,
the Slutsky-Brandt (SB) attack, that is a specific case of
the general FPEP class previously described. Their prac-
tical implementation uses a CNOT gate as entangling
operation, and error-discard as reconciliation procedure.
This attack can be shown to attain the maximum col-
lision probability, as given by Eq.(34), and is therefore
optimal within its class.
The SB attack is now shortly recalled. Eve employs
a probe system with the same dimensionality of the sig-
nal (a qubit), and the entangling CNOT gate uses the
signal as control and the probe as target. The computa-
tional basis of the CNOT is the same “symmetric” basis
{|e0〉, |e1〉} of Eqs.(2); with some abuse of notation, the
same symbols |e0〉 and |e1〉 are used to indicate an arbi-
trary basis in Eve’s space. The initial probe state is
|w〉 = 1√
2
[
(C + S)|e0〉+ (C − S)|e1〉
]
, (35)
where the parameters S and C are sine and cosine of
some angle, function of the desired QBER e ≤ 1/2:
S =
√
2e, C =
√
1− 2e. (36)
The total system, upon Eve’s action, becomes entan-
gled, and its state can be decomposed according to the
definition of Eq.(1), giving
|ψuu
u¯u¯
〉 = C |e0〉+ |e1〉√
2
± 1√
2
· S |e0〉 − |e1〉√
2
, (37)
|ψuu¯
u¯u
〉 = |Te〉 def= 1√
2
· S |e1〉 − |e0〉√
2
. (38)
Similar equations hold in the other basis. The probability
of having an error is, as expected, 〈Te|Te〉 = S2/2 = e.
“Error states”, that is the states |ψaa¯〉, are characterised
by independence from the actual signal a, as they are
always equal to |Te〉. As a consequence of this, when
an error takes place, Eve has no information at all on
8the transmitted bit – the entangling unitary is in fact
optimised for protocols which discard errors instead of
correcting them.
The inference power of the SB attack can be calculated,
as already seen, from the fidelity of |ψuu〉 with respect to
|ψu¯u¯〉; for e ≤ 1/3, it is identical to that of Eq.(33), which
proves that this attack is optimal in the class of attacks
on protocols which discard errors of the sifted key:
√
f =
|〈ψuu|ψu¯u¯〉|
‖ψuu‖ · ‖ψu¯u¯‖ =
|2C2 − S2|
2C2 + S2
=
|1− 3e|
1− e . (39)
IV. RECONCILIATION: ERROR DISCARD
VERSUS ERROR CORRECTION
As emphasised earlier, a QKD protocol, like BB84, can
be implemented in many variants, by adopting different
approaches for reconciliation. Each of these dialects is
a protocol on its own, and trivially comparing the dis-
carded fraction for different protocols makes as much
sense as comparing apples with pears. However, a com-
mon benchmark can be found in the length of the final
secret with respect to the length n of the sifted key (not
the length n¯ of the reconciled key).
The problem is further complicated by the fact that
the privacy-amplification bound is based on the average
collision probability of the sifted and reconciled key. If
reconciliation is performed in clear, by exchanging pub-
lic messages on the classical channel, 〈P 1c 〉 of the sifted
key is modified in ways that are very difficult to account
for. For this reason, it is established practice to exchange
reconciliation information in encrypted form, with a one-
time pad. This, of course, requires a previous secret to
be shared by Alice and Bob; this secret is consumed dur-
ing the execution of the protocol, and must enter the
final balance of secret key production. The alternative
approach of exchanging public messages and then reduc-
ing the final key of an equivalent amount has never been
proven to be more efficient, but it is more difficult to
justify theoretically (see, e.g., [32]).
Articles on BB84 with error discard usually do not
mention an explicit procedure for discarding faulty bits;
but it is clear that locating all errors in the sifted key
is exactly as difficult as correcting the string altogether
(since the output of one procedure can be directly used
to implement the other one), which implies a minimum
cost nh(e), where h is the binary entropy function h(e) =
−elog2e − (1 − e)log2(1 − e), due to the Shannon limit
[18]. The secret gain is therefore at most
Gd = n(1− e)(1− τd(e))− nh(e), (40)
because (1) the sifted key of length n is reduced to a rec-
onciled key of length n¯ = n(1 − e) by discarding the ne
errors, (2) the reconciled key is compressed by a factor
1 − τd during privacy amplification, and (3) the cost of
tight error discard, nh(e), must be subtracted from the
final balance. The subscript d of τ is meant to remember
that this is the discarded fraction in case of reconcili-
ation through error discard. This gain can be directly
compared with that of protocols with error correction.
In the latter case, n¯ = n (no bits are discarded), and τ
becomes τc:
Gc = n(1− τc(e))− nh(e). (41)
Obviously, 0 ≤ τc ≤ τd ≤ 1, because more information
is available to Eve with error discard than with error
correction (i.e., the location of all bits received as errors,
and the fact that all retained bits were received without
errors). One can consider also a case in which errors
are corrected, but the positions of the corrected spots
is leaked to Eve;[45] the previous considerations are not
invalidated. It is immediate to see that error correction
is always better than error discard, because
Gc −Gd
n
= (1 − e)(τd − τc) + e(1− τc) ≥ 0. (42)
Therefore, it makes sense to see what happens to
the “optimal BB84 attack” when reconciliation is done
through error correction, a case analysed in section V.
One may legitimately think that other reconciliation pro-
cedures could lead to an even larger gain; for instance,
an algorithm could select an error-free part of the sifted
string of length n¯ by exchanging a message shorter than
n¯h(e), as long as n¯ < n. The overall secret gain is most
probably not larger thanGc, but this statement has never
been formally proved. Other variants might be explored,
like reconciling Alice’s key to the sifted key of Bob, in-
stead of the opposite, or changing both to a third com-
mon string, or merging reconciliation and privacy am-
plification into a single step, or even replacing standard
privacy amplification with some other procedure in order
to get closer to the I(A : B)− I(A : E) bound. However,
one should also remember that QKD proofs are not after
finding the “optimal” protocol, but after proving that a
given, probably sub-optimal but reasonably efficient pro-
tocol is secure under some conditions.
Changing the focus from one protocol to another is
moreover often not a good idea because QKD proofs are
a lengthy and expensive collective effort, which must be
to some extent restarted when the protocol is changed.
And all this, not to speak of the apparent impossibility to
parametrise the space of “all possible QKD protocols”.
For QKD protocols, standardisation is more important
than optimisation.
V. THE SLUTSKY-BRANDT ATTACK WITH
AN ERROR-CORRECTION PROCEDURE
The SB attack will now be analysed in the context
of a BB84 protocol using encrypted error correction, in
order to investigate its claimed optimality. Because of
this choice for reconciliation, the amount of information
leaked to Eve during the raw exchange plus the knowl-
edge of the encoding basis is all what concerns the cal-
culation of the average collision probability. Since only
9FIG. 2: The fraction of the sifted key that must be discarded
during privacy amplification in order to counter a SB attack
against a protocol with encrypted error correction, Eq.(45),
versus the QBER e compared with Lu¨tkenhaus bound [7],
Eq.(46). The first curve reaches its maximum at e ∼ 0.277,
the bound at e = 0.5, where its value is 1. The curves are
non-decreasing, see the discussion in section IID.
individual attacks are allowed, one can consider Eve’s
activity as being performed on two separate strings of
n(1− e) correct bits and ne faulty bits respectively. The
discarded fraction can thus be written as
τ(e) = (1− e)τ= + eτ6=, (43)
where the first term is related to correct bits and the
second one to faulty bits; this expression is equivalent to
τ(e) = 1 + log2
(〈P 1c=〉1−e〈P 1c 6=〉e) , (44)
where 〈P 1c=〉 and 〈P 1c 6=〉 are the individual average col-
lision probabilities for error-free and faulty bits respec-
tively. τ= is obviously the same quantity determined in
section II for the SB attack, see Eq.(34). To calculate
the amount of information leaked to Eve from erroneous
bits, note that when the bit measured by Bob is wrong,
the state of the probe collapses to |Te〉, Eq.(38), indepen-
dently from the bit sent by Alice and the encoding basis.
Therefore, Eve has no mean to distinguish between Al-
ice’s two equiprobable bits, and consequently τ6= = 0.
Using Eqs.(43) and (34) one finds
τ(e) = (1− e) log2(1 + 4e− 4e3 +O(e4))
= log2
(
1 + 4e− 4e2 − 12e3 +O(e4)) . (45)
This discarded fraction can now be compared to the
general scenario of individual attacks considered by
Lu¨tkenhaus in the momentous paper [7], where the au-
thor concludes that τ(e) is bounded by
τ(e) ≤ log2(1 + 4e− 4e2). (46)
In figure 2, the discarded fraction necessary to counter
a SB attack is compared with Lu¨tkenhaus bound (which
was not claimed to be tight). The latter is always higher,
hence stronger, than the security curve derived from the
SB attack, the two curves merging only at e = 0. For
small error rates, most bits are exchanged correctly and,
as the SB attack on correct bits is optimal, the curves
converge. When more errors are introduced, Eve’s lack
of information on faulty bits weakens her attack.
This shows that in a QKD protocol with encrypted er-
ror correction, the SB attack does not fill the known up-
per bound, leaving potential room for stronger individual
attacks. The SB curve is however a lower bound, since
the eavesdropping strategy is given explicitly. In the
next section, the question will be investigated whether
a stronger FPEP attack can be found, by appropriately
balancing the amount of information Eve can gain from
error-free bits and from bits received incorrectly by Bob.
VI. AN OPTIMAL ATTACK AGAINST BB84
WITH ERROR CORRECTION
A. With leakage of error positions
This section revisits the FPEP class of attacks against
a BB84 QKD protocol where errors of the sifted key are
corrected; however, it is assumed that the positions of
these errors become known to the eavesdropper. This
latter apparently peculiar hypothesis is investigated also
in [7], where the author shows that, due to spoiling in-
formation, this case can be used to draw an upper bound
also for more secure protocols where Eve has no informa-
tion about which bits were received incorrectly by Bob.
The approach to the security proof is very similar to
that presented in section III, the difference being, that
here, for a given, known encoding basis, Eve must dis-
tinguish between two pure states for bits received cor-
rectly, and two different pure states for bits received in-
correctly, since there are two possibilities for the “col-
lapse” of Eq.(28). For instance, if the basis is {|u〉, |u¯〉}
and the bit was received incorrectly (which happened
with probability e), Eve must distinguish between |ψuu¯〉
and |ψu¯u〉; if the bit was instead received correctly, the
two states are, as before, |ψuu〉 and |ψu¯u¯〉. The results
for the second encoding basis are identical, due to the
intrinsic symmetry of the FPEP method. Eq.(31) is thus
changed into
〈P 1c 〉 =
(
1− 12f[=]
)1−e (
1− 12f[ 6=]
)e
, (47)
with f[=] and f[ 6=] defined by the following expressions
[which are then simplified with Eqs.(22b, 22c, 22d, 22e)],
where the imbalance δ is constrained by Eq.(23):
√
f[=] =
|〈ψuu|ψu¯u¯〉|
‖ψuu‖ · ‖ψu¯u¯‖ =
| 12 − e− δ|
1− e , (48a)√
f[ 6=] =
|〈ψuu¯|ψu¯u〉|
‖ψuu¯‖ · ‖ψu¯u‖ =
| 12 − e+ δ|
e
. (48b)
In order to find the optimal attack, it is now sufficient
to maximise the collision probability in Eq.(47) over δ.
10
It is easier to visualise the optimisation problem through
the discarded fraction. In fact, note that
τ = (1− e)log2(2− f[=]) + e log2(2− f[ 6=])
≤ log2
[
(1− e)(2− f[=]) + e(2− f[ 6=])
]
. (49)
Finding the maximum 2δ = −(1 − 2e)2 of the upper
bound is trivial since the argument is a second-degree
polynomial in δ. But, for this value of δ, the two fidelities
are equal, and therefore inequality (49) is filled, and the
optimisation problem is solved. One obtains
f[=] = f[ 6=] = fmin(e) = (1− 2e)2, and (50)
τ(e) = log2 [2− fmin(e)] = log2(1 + 4e− 4e2), (51)
which is exactly Lu¨tkenhaus bound of Eq.(46). Whereas
previously this upper bound allowed some margin for
lower security bounds to be found, the present optimisa-
tion proves it to be tight when error positions are leaked.
[46] Note that, due to the symmetry e ↔ 1 − e, the dis-
carded fraction cannot be a monotonous curve in this
case. Above e = 50%, Eve’s tactic for total knowledge
cannot be modelled by the unitary matrix of the FPEP
parametrisation; an additional dissipative evolution on
Bob’s bit is necessary.
B. Without leakage of error positions
The previous section considered the implementation of
a QKD protocol with error correction and leakage of the
positions of the errors, because that assumption makes
the mathematical derivation particularly simple. How-
ever, more secure error-correcting protocols can be de-
vised, in which Eve has no access to this piece of in-
formation. This section investigates whether a different
bound is proper to this instance.
With Eve’s assumed lack of knowledge on the error
positions, the final state of the probe after the entangling
evolution and the “collapse” at Bob’s site is the density
matrix σ = TrBob(χ), with χ being the joint state of the
probe and the signal. The state σ will be a statistical
mixture, over Bob’s possible outcomes; namely
σa = |ψaa〉〈ψaa|+ |ψaa¯〉〈ψaa¯|, (52)
when the input state |a〉 is sent by Alice; note that |ψaa〉
and |ψaa¯〉 are not normalised; if the normalised vectors
were used instead, the two addends would have a factor
1 − e and e respectively in front. Eve must distinguish
between the two density matrices ensuing from the two
equiprobable states |a〉 of Alice, with a ∈ {u, u¯}.
Suppose that Eve implements the following measure-
ment strategy, on which there is, a-priori, no claim of
optimality. First, she performs a projective measure-
ment to separate the {|ψuu〉, |ψu¯u¯〉} subspace from the
{|ψuu¯〉, |ψu¯u〉} subspace (finding the first case with proba-
bility 1−e, and the second one with probability e, but this
is irrelevant); the separation is possible because the two
subspaces are orthogonal, as shown in Sec.(II C). Then,
if the first outcome was found, she proceeds with the
same measurement of Sec.(VIA) for this case, achieving
a collision probability equal to f[=]; similarly, for the sec-
ond case, she achieves f[ 6=]. Given that, for these two
measurements, both f[=] and f[ 6=] have the same value
fmin(e) = (1− 2e)2, the average 〈P 1c 〉 turns out to be the
same as for the case of error correction with leakage of
error positions.
Therefore, there exists a measurement strategy which
is ignorant of the positions of the errors and fills the
bound of Eq.(51). It is however obvious that all attack
strategies that can be implemented without this piece of
knowledge can be implemented also if it is available: in
other words, the set of allowed attacks without leakage
is strictly included in the set with leakage, and therefore,
the security bound for the current case cannot exceed the
security bound of Sec.(VIA). Thus, the explicit attack
just shown implies that the two bounds are the same,
and that the attack itself is optimal.
It is remarkable that, similarly to Eq.(31), also in this
case the maximum collision probability is linked to the
fidelity [33] of the conditional density matrices σu and
σu¯. The calculation is greatly simplified by the subspaces
{|ψuu〉, |ψu¯u¯〉} and {|ψuu¯〉, |ψu¯u〉} being orthogonal; using
Eqs.(48) one obtains
f(σu, σu¯) = Tr
2
√√
σu σu¯
√
σu =
[
(1− e)f
1
2
[=] + ef
1
2
[ 6=]
]2
=
(| 12 − e− δ|+ | 12 − e+ δ|)2 = (1 − 2e)2, (53)
and therefore 〈P 1c 〉 = 1 − 12f . This identity may be true
here only due to the large number of constraints dictated
by the symmetries of the BB84 protocol. However, it
would be interesting to know whether the result holds
more generally. This problem is somehow similar to that
of minimum error probability or accessible information.
Despite intuition, it is known [31, 34] that these two are
not equivalent for mixed states. It is likely that the max-
imisation of the collision probability is still a different
problem. Formally, the problem would read like this:
provided a flat bit S is transmitted through a quantum
channel, encoded in non-orthogonal density matrices ρ0
and ρ1, what is the maximum collision probability of the
distribution of S that can be reconstructed by the re-
ceiver by means of quantum measurements?
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that no real “threat” to the security
of BB84 QKD protocols stems from recent developments
in implementing an entangling probe attack. Not only
is this attack (claimed to be the “most powerful indi-
vidual attack”[1, 4]) not threatening the security bound
derived previously by Lu¨tkenhaus [7], but it is also shown
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to be sub-optimal in an efficient and complete QKD im-
plementation. The SB attack is only an optimal attack
for those specific types of QKD protocols in which the
reconciliation procedure is to somehow discard all faulty
bits, which is a less desirable scheme as it leads to a
shorter final shared key.
It should also be pointed out that experiments cannot
allow for the investigation of fundamental security lim-
its, as “security” is not an observable; they can only shed
light on the technological feasibility of specific eavesdrop-
ping attacks.
In view of the previous considerations, the recent head-
line in Nature purporting that “quantum cryptography
is hacked” [5, 6] as a result of the successful implementa-
tion of an SB attack is an unfortunate misunderstanding.
In fact, the researchers whose work is highlighted in the
news feature do not themselves make any such sensation-
alistic claim, even though they fail to mention existing
security proofs and do not comment on the consequences
their attack has on existing security bounds.
In this paper it has been shown that improved analysis
of FPEP attacks leads to finding explicit optimal attacks
for the case considered in [7], filling the bound introduced
there, which therefore turns out to be sharp. This holds
independently of whether error positions are leaked to
Eve. The analysis gives a simple recipe for devising opti-
mal individual attacks, the most powerful eavesdropping
attacks that could be implemented with nowadays tech-
nology. The complete statement is the following. An
ideal BB84 QKD exchange where the dimensionality of
the signal space is not changed and the imperfection of
the experimental apparatus consists at most in a noisy
and lossy channel, and for which reconciliation through
error correction is performed, followed by privacy ampli-
fication, is strongly secure on average against individual
attacks if and only if the discarded fraction τ(e) satisfies
τ(e) ≥ log2(1 + 4e− 4e2),
(where e is the QBER of the sifted key) both in the
case that the positions of errors come to be known to
the eavesdropper, and in the case that they do not.
A byproduct of this analysis is the question whether
the maximum collision probability in distinguishing two
mixed density matrices is always one minus one half of
the fidelity of the carrier states.
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